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Dear Dr. Parkinson:
On 11 and 12 October 1994, I convened the third meeting of the NASA Advisory
Council Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions at the
Johnson Space Center (JSC). This report is based on the material presented at the
third meeting as well as extensive work done by individual Task Force members and
our technical support staff prior to the meeting.
I would like to highlight the fact that the Task Force members and staff received
complete cooperation from all the individuals, both civil servant and contractors, we
worked with during the review process. This type of support is critical to the success
of any external advisory group and is very much appreciated.
Beyond the high level of cooperation that the Task Force received, I also want to
point out the excellent work that has been done throughout the Phase 1 program.
This was made apparent in the well organized, comprehensive briefings presented at
the meeting. It is clear that the newly appointed Phase 1 Program Manager, Mr.
Tommy W. Holloway, has already had a positive impact on the process. Mr.
Holloway's grasp of the overall strategy for Phase I as well as the technical details is
most impressive as is his obvious ability to channel and motivate the diverse group
of people involved in the program.
One aspect of the Shuttle-Mir program which continues to cause the Task Force
concern is the complexity and reliability of the Androgenous Peripheral Docking
System (APDS) portion of the Orbiter Docking System. At this point, the pyrotechnic
bolts which serve as the primary backup system for the mechanical approach for
releasing the docking hooks still have not been certified to NASA standards. In the
absence of such certification, the only remaining backup option is the EVA to remove
the 96 bolts which connect the ODS docking base to the external airlock. If this
option becomes necessary, the only port on Mir capable of docking the Orbiter will
be permanently blocked. As a very similar system will also be used for the Space
Station and will rely on the same demate procedures, these issues are critical to the
entire program, not just Phase 1.
I will convene the next meeting of the Task Force in the first quarter of CY 1995.
that time, we will review the following issues:
• Status of the Orbiter Docking System
• Preliminary results from STS-63
@
At
Preparations for STS-71 and 5T5-74
• Status of Shuttie-Mir launch constraints, performance improvements, and abort
planning
• Training for the mating of the Docking Module to the Orbiter Docking System
during STS-74
• Status of the OV-103 OMDP modification decision
• Civil servant/contractor staffing plan for Russia
- Interaction of Phase 1 and Phase 2 personnel
- NASA and contractor functions
- Transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2
In the interim, individual Task Force members, technical advisors, and technical
support staff will work with the Phase 1 team to obtain additional data and insight in
these areas.
Sincerely,
Thomas P. Staffo_
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
In May 1994, the Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking
Missions was established by the NASA Advisory Council. Its purpose is to
review Phase 1 (Shuttle-Mir) planning, training, operations, rendezvous and
docking, and management and to provide interim reports containing specific
recommendations to the Advisory Council.
Phase 1 represents the building block to create the experience and technical
expertise for an International Space Station. The Phase 1 program brings
together the United States and Russia in a major cooperative and contractual
program that takes advantage of both countries' capabilities.
The content of the Phase 1 program consists of the following elements as
defined by the Phase 1 Program Management Plan, dated October 6, 1994:
• Shuttle-Mir rendezvous and docking missions
• Astronaut long duration presence on Mir
• Requirements for Mir support of Phase 1 when astronauts are not on
board
• Outfitting Spektr and Priroda modules with NASA science, research,
and risk mitigation equipment
• Related ground support requirements of NASA and the Russian Space
Agency (RSA) to support Phase 1
• Integrated NASA and RSA launch schedules and manifests
The first meeting of the Task Force was held at the Johnson Space Center (JSC)
on May 24 and 25, 1994 with a preliminary report submitted to the NASA
Advisory Council on June 6, 1994. The second meeting of the Task Force was
held at JSC on July 12 and 13, 1994 and a detailed report containing a series of
specific recommendations was submitted on July 29, 1994.
This report reflects the results of the third Task Force meeting which was held
at JSC on 11 and 12 October, 1994. The briefings presented at that meeting
reviewed NASA's response to the Task Force recommendations made to date
and provided background data and current status on several critical areas
which the Task Force had not addressed in its previous reports.
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The material presented in this report has been organized into the following
subject areas:
• Management
• Mission Requirements
• Orbiter Docking System (ODS)
• Plume, Docking, and Mated Loads
• Rendezvous and Docking
Within each section, any previous Task Force recommendations applicable to
the subject area are listed; observations and findings are detailed; and new
recommendations are identified.
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2.0 MANAGEMENT
2.1 Management Structure/Roles and Responsibilities
2.1.1 Previous Recommendations
2.1.1.1 The Task Force recommended a number of management
changes for Phase 1 in its second report. The following is a
brief synopsis of those recommendations (for a complete
listing please see the second report of the Task Force dated
July 29, 1994):
A Phase 1 Project Manager should be established who
represents and reports directly to the Associate
Administrator for Space Flight and is accountable for
the implementation of Phase 1.
The Phase 1 Project Manager should oversee the
development of a Project Plan.
The JSC Russian Projects Office should be matrixed to
support the Phase 1 Project Manager with the Director
of the JSC Russian Projects Office serving as the Phase
1 Deputy Project Manager
The Director of the JSC Russian Projects Office should
continue to coordinate the administrative activities of
the Joint Working Groups which are matrixed
operationally to the Phase 1 Project Manager.
The joint NASA/RSA working groups should be
matrixed intact and with the necessary administrative
support from the JSC to support the Phase 1 Project
Manager
The International Space Station Alpha (ISSA) Russian
Programs Phase 1 Office should be matrixed intact to
the Phase 1 Project Manager. The Russian Programs
Phase 1 Office Manager should continue to coordinate
the RSA contract activities.
The ISSA Program Manager should be designated as
the sole source for ISSA risk mitigation requirements.
The Associate Administrator for Life and Microgravity
Sciences and Applications should be designated as the
focal point for the international research community's
requirements and priorities.
The Office of Space Flight(OSF) Chief Medical Officer
should chair the Medical Policy Board for the
development of medical support for ISSA risk
mitigation and all NASA/RSA joint development of
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2.1.2
medical support for ISSA risk mitigation. The OSF
Chief Medical Officer should coordinate those
requirements with RSA through the joint NASA/RSA
Medical Policy Board and the Phase 1 Project Manager.
Observations
On October 6, 1994 the Associate Administrator for Space Flight,
Jeremiah W. Pearson UI, signed a decision package outlining a new
Phase 1 Program Management Plan. This Phase 1 Program
Management Plan was concurred on by the Program Managers for
the Space Shuttle and Space Station, the Deputy Associate
Administrators for Space Shuttle and Space Station, the Deputy
Associate Administrator for Life and Microgravity Sciences and
Applications, and the Director of the Johnson Space Center.
The Phase 1 Program Management Plan describes the organizational
structure, joint working group structure, roles and responsibilities,
and top-level plan to develop and execute the Phase 1 program.
The Phase 1 Program Management Plan specifically addresses the
Task Force's previous recommendations as follows (please reference
the organization chart on the following page).
Structure
The Phase 1 Program Management Plan establishes a Phase 1
Program Manager, Mr. Tommy W. Holloway, with a small staff
located at the Johnson Space Center who will have overall
responsibility for Phase 1. Mr. Holloway's sole responsibility will
be as the Phase 1 Program Manager and he will not have dual
responsibilities in any other organization. He is accountable for the
implementation of Phase 1 and he represents and reports directly to
the Associate Administrator for Space Flight. He will ensure that
management of full-time Mir operations as well as Shuttle-Mir
operations and cargo integration is adequately addressed.
Additional responsibilities include:
• Chair the Phase 1 Management Group, which will establish
a Phase 1 Manifest and a Resource Allocation Plan.
• Chair the Phase I Program Review Control Board (PRCB).
• NASA Chair of the Joint Management Working Group.
• Chair of the Orbit Mission Management Team for Phase 1
flights.
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The JSC Russian Projects Office has been matrixed to support the
Phase 1 Program Manager with the Director of the JSC Russian
Projects Office, Mr. Frank Culbertson, serving as the Phase 1 Deputy
Program Manager. The Director of the JSC Russian Projects Office
will continue to coordinate the administrative activities of the Joint
Working Groups which have also been matrixed operationally to the
Phase 1 Project Manager.
The International Space Station Program Office (ISSA) will manage
the ISSA risk mitigation program and provide requirements to the
Phase 1 Program Manager. In addition, the ISSA Russian Programs-
Phase 1 Office will be matrixed to the Phase 1 Program Manager.
In this capacity, it will monitor, administer, and be responsible for
the conduct of the Phase 1 portion of the $400 million contract with
RSA. ISSA's Manager, Russian Programs-Phase 1, is the Program
Manager for the contract. The Deputy Manager, Russian Programs-
Phase 1, is the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
(COTR) for the contract.
The Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications
(OLMSA) will constitute and manage a Payload Steering Committee
(PSC) that will identify all Level 1 science, research, and associated
risk mitigation requirements. It will provide resources for science
and technology hardware development, associated experiments, and
mission management. Level II management and implementation
responsibility for the Phase 10LMSA program has been delegated
to the JSC Space and Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD). SLSD will be
responsible for maintaining OLMSA cognizance via the PSC of all
EVA, risk mitigation, and medical operations requirements under
consideration for Phase 1.
The Office of Space Flight Chief Medical Officer will chair the
Medical Policy Board for the development of medical support for
ISSA risk mitigation and all NASA/RSA joint development of
medical support for Phase 1.
The Phase 1 program integration between NASA and the Russians
will continue to be done through the joint working groups (see
organization chart on page 5). These working groups are co-chaired
by RSA and NASA management who are responsible for the
management of their respective area.
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program Control
The Phase 1 Program Review Control Board (PRCB) will be
responsible for baselining and controlling the requirements and
documents for the Phase I Program. Top Level Phase 1 schedules
will be developed and controlled by the Phase 1 Program Manager
(Phase I PRCB). The normal Shuttle mission preparation
production schedule, however, will be used to schedule the shuttle
activities, modified as required to support joint Mir/Shuttle flights.
The Phase 1 PRCB will be responsible for and delegate to the Phase
1 Control Board (CB) certain responsibilities. The CB will manage
and control the U.S. resource allocations on Russian launch vehicles
and on the Mir. This includes managing NASA input to the
Russian launch vehicle manifests and providing configuration
control of the U.S. hardware on Mir. It will provide support to the
Russians for hardware processing, checkout, installation, long-term
sustaining engineering, and certification of flight readiness for
NASA hardware deployed on the Mir, Spektr, and Priroda. It will
also manage, integrate, and provide operations requirements and
real time support to the Russians for the Mir operations which do
not involve Shuttle. Top level Mir support schedules will be
developed and controlled by the Phase 1 CB.
The Phase 1 CB will also be responsible to the Phase 1 Program
Manager for flight readiness determination and will sign certificates
of flight readiness (CoFR) for each Mir increment and applicable
Shuttle flights for NASA supplied hardware for Spektr, Priroda, and
Mir, Mir integration support to RSA, and NASA supphed
operational requirements for Mir.
The existing Space Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB), Mission Integration Control Board (MICB), Systems
Integration Review (SIR), and Orbiter Change Control Board (CCB)
will continue to manage Shuttle hardware and implementation of
Shuttle missions to support joint operations.
It is the Task Force's opinion that this plan eliminates duplicate
program structures and capitalizes on existing experience,
minimizes the impact on the existing interfaces with the Russian
Space Agency, provides a single focused team for overall Phase 1
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planning, coordination, and implementation, and facilitates further
the coordination between the Space Shuttle Program, the ISSA, the
payload community and the Russian Space Agency. The key to
success, however, will be the implementation of the plan. For it to
succeed, the Phase 1 Program Manager and his team will require
the unstinting cooperation of all the NASA organizations in this
critical program.
2.1.3 Recommendations
No additional recommendations.
2.2 NASA Presence in Russia
2.2.1 Issue: Should NASA civil servants assume the role currently
performed by Rockwell in the technical integration of NPO-Energia
hardware into the Orbiter Docking System and Docking Module
following STS-71?
2.2.2 Observations
Rockwell possesses both the requisite technical knowledge and
working relationships with NPO-Energia. The schedule and
delivery dates remain ambitious, Phase 1 development is nearing
completion, and any disruption could endanger an already very
ambitious schedule.
2.2.3 Recommendation
2.2.3.1 The Task Force concurs with NASA's decision to retain
Rockwell as the party responsible for the overall
technical integration role for Orbiter Docking System
and Docking Module development and implementation.
NASA should take action to capture this experience and
knowledge and develop the required working
relationships with RSA prior to the transition to Phase 2.
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3.0 MISSION REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Technical and Science Objectives
3.1.1 Issue
The primary objectives of the Phase 1 program are as follows:
1. Reduce technical risks associated with the construction and
operation of the international space station.
2. Conduct combined international space operations and joint
space technology demonstrations.
3. Provide early opportunities for extended scientific and
research activities.
Although the objectives are well defined, the Task Force
encountered a level of confusion regarding the process for collecting
requirements from the different sources, their prioritization, and
their assignment to a specific mission. In its report dated July 29,
1994, the Task Force observed that the:
"three sources of mission requirements for Phase 1 are
neither well coordinated nor focused. There is confusion
and uncertainty about priorities with regard to ISSA risk
mitigation, joint operations, and utilization as well as
organizational responsibility for collecting and
integrating these requirements."
3.1.2 Observations
Phase 1 Mission Management Group
The Task Force found that NASA has made significant progress in
this area since the first Task Force meeting in May. The most
significant step is the creation of a Phase 1 Management Group,
chaired by the Phase 1 Program Manager, which is now responsible
for baselining and maintaining the Phase 1 Manifest and Phase 1
Resource Allocation Plan. Requirements are to be submitted to the
Management Group by the following organizations:
• Space Station Program Office (SSPO): Provides all ISSA risk
mitigation operational and hardware test and demonstration
requirements.
• Payload Steering Committee (PSC): Constituted and
managed by the Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and
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Applications (OLMSA), the PSC provides all science,
research, and associated risk mitigation requirements.
• Space Shuttle Program (SSP): Provides all SSP operational
and hardware test and demonstration requirements.
• JSC/Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Office: Provides all EVA
development and testing requirements.
• Public Affairs Office (PAO): Provides all public affairs
requirements which utilize mission resources.
• JSC/Space and Life Sciences Division (SLSD): Provides all
medical and operational support requirements.
The process of selecting experiments within each discipline was a
subject in several presentations made to the Task Force, specifically
in the areas of risk mitigation and science.
l_sk Mitigation
In the area of risk mitigation, two main goals have been identified
for Phase 1. These goals and their subsidiary elements are as
follows:
• Risk mitigation for ISSA Phases 2 and 3
- U.S. hardware development, operations, crew procedures,
and crew health.
- Experiments addressing:
o ISSA control and Automated Rendezvous and Docking
(AR&D).
o The environment at 51.6 degree inclination
(micrometeroids, debris, and contamination).
o EVA assembly and maintenance tasks.
o Crew health and life support.
o Structural dynamics characterization and vibration
isolation.
o Operational techniques.
• Working processes involving joint U.S. and Russian technical
teams
- Mir lifetime extension: Photovoltaic array replacement.
- Technology demonstration: Solar dynamics prototype.
Responsibility for selecting the experiments necessary to meet these
requirements was assigned to the Phase 1 Integrated Product Team
(IPT). The Phase 1 IPT created a very methodical experiment
review and evaluation process to assess the proposals for risk
mitigation experiments submitted to it. The IPT evaluated and
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ranked each experiment both on technical merit and cost/payback
benefit.
At the end of the review and evaluation process, the IPT had
determined that 25 percent of the proposed experiments were
directly applicable to ISSA risk. The baselined experiments thus
selected went through an extensive review process which included
the ISSA Phase 2 Analysis Integration Team (AIT), Space Station
Program Office management, JSC/Space and Life Sciences
Directorate (peer review), the NASA Administrator, and an
independent Phase 1 risk mitigation assessment team at NASA
Headquarters.
It is evident that the effort involved in identifying and selecting
these experiments has been very focused and well organized. The
experiments which survived this rigorous process have been
tentatively assigned to specific Shutfle-Mir missions or Shuttle
missions. Only those experiments which require extended durations
or presence on Mir have been assigned to the Mir rendezvous and
docking missions. Although the master schedule for these
experiments will certainly change based on experience and
circumstances, the degree of planning conducted to date and the
flexibility of the organizations involved will certainly mitigate such
impacts.
Science
The process for identifying and selecting Phase 1 science
experiments is divided into two segments. The first involves those
missions (STS-60, Mir 18, and STS-71) which were addressed in the
original agreement with Russia. Within the NASA science
community these missions are considered Phase 1A. When the level
of cooperation with Russia expanded to include their participation
in ISSA, the opportunity for science expanded considerably. These
missions (i.e., STS-74 and subsequent missions) are considered
Phase lB.
The process involved in selecting the Phase 1A experiments has
already been completed as dictated by the mission schedule -- the
STS-60 mission was flown in February 1994, the Mir 18 mission is
currently scheduled for March 1995, and the STS-71 mission is
slated for late May 1995. Several pieces of experiment hardware
have already arrived at Mir, carried aboard a Progress flight in
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August. A U.S. astronaut, Norman Thagard, wiU be transported to
Mir on the Mir 18 flight and remain there for three months. At the
end of that period, Thagard and his fellow Mir cosmonauts, will be
returned to Earth aboard STS-71, the first Shuttle-Mir rendezvous
and docking mission. In taking advantage of this extended duration
and joint operations with the Russians, the objectives for STS-71
include:
• Retrieving the data and samples collected during the 90-day
Mir mission onto the Shuttle for postflight analysis.
• Collecting data and samples from the long duration crew
members which will improve our understanding of the
effects of long duration space flight on the human body.
• Comparing U.S. and Russian hardware and protocols within
the same investigation to obtain a mutual understanding of
scientific approach and equipment.
• Obtaining postflight life sciences data on the long duration
crew to understand physiologic recovery mechanisms and
the effects of the countermeasures.
The prioritization of research and payloads opportunities during
Phase 1 is being performed and executed by research interests both
within NASA and the broader academic community. A process has
been established that is both driven by the concerns of the scientific
and technological communities and is responsive to the very rapid
planning cycle required by the Phase 1 program.
After initial negotiations with the Russians as to the resources
expected to be available on Mir, representatives of the major
research disciplines in NASA's overall orbital research program
worked with the Shuttle organization responsible for resources on
the Orbiter/Spacelab combination to determine what payload
hardware could be ready for operation during the Phase 1B
program given schedule and budget constraints. _ was
placed on selecting payloads that make use of the long-term orbital
operations available on Mir by placing facilities-class hardware on
Mir, with resupply, sample return, and payload enhancement
carried out by Shuttle missions docking at Mir over the two and
one-half year Phase 1B period. This includes using the Shuttle for
the launch and return of long-duration crewmembers (both U.S. and
Russian) for the purpose of obtaining thorough and calibrated pre-
and post-flight medical data. The second priority is to make use of
the Shuttle as an opportunity to conduct research during Shuttle
free-flight periods before and/or after docking with the Mir.
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While the payload selection was driven primarily by stringent
practical constraints such as schedule, budget, and hardware
availability, the selection of the specific investigations to be
performed with this hardware is being carried out through open
solicitations to the worldwide academic community through NASA
Research Announcements and Announcements of Opportunity from
the various discipline science organizations. An external peer
review process is being utilized to make actual science content
selection, thus driving the investigation-unique supplies to be
carried to Mir by the various Shuttle flights.
In creating the Phase 1 Management Group and assigning to it the
responsibility for collecting and integrating Phase 1 mission
requirements, the Office of Space Flight has alleviated the Task
Force's concerns in this critical area. This major step, coupled with
the excellent work done by the source organizations in carefully
reviewing and prioritizing their requirements, will help ensure that
NASA and the nation gains the greatest possible benefit from the
Phase 1 program.
3.1.3 Recommendations
No additional recommendations.
3.2 Number of Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions
3.2.1 Issue: During earlier presentations to the Task Force, it became
evident that the precise number of Shuttle-Mir missions required to
meet Phase 1 objectives had not been clearly established. The
number of such missions will have considerable impact on the
overall Shuttle manifest and could require a second Orbiter to be
modified to dock with Mir.
3.2.2 Observations
The consensus displayed on this issue during the briefings was
impressive. The head of the Phase 1 IPT, who is responsible for risk
mitigation requirements; the science community; the Shuttle
Manifest and Schedule Office; and the Phase 1 Program Manager
were unanimous in stating that all critical Phase 1 objectives can be
accomplished with seven Shuttle-Mir missions. In fact, the point
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was clearly made that payloads exist for only seven missions given
the scheduling constraints imposed by various hardware modules.
The case was also made that microgravity science will, in most
cases, be better served by Shuttle flights dedicated to that purpose
rather than Shutfle-Mir missions.
To ensure flexibility, NASA has preserved the option of flying up to
ten missions as stated in the original implementing agreement with
Russia. During the September 22 - 28, 1994 meeting of the Joint
Mission Working Group in Moscow a firm commitment was
obtained from RSA to keep the options for Shuttle-Mir missions 8, 9,
and 10 open. As stated in the protocol from that meeting, "The
decision on an additional mission shall be mutually agreed upon no
later than 18 months before the proposed launch date."
A comprehensive approach to Shuttle-Mir manifesting exists and it
appears that NASA will be able to adjust the plan as circumstances
dictate. There are a number of factors, however, which NASA must
consider in committing to a specific number of launches.
First is the primary Phase 1 objective -- risk mitigation. As
discussed in the previous section, NASA has done a thorough job of
identifying, reviewing, and selecting the risk mitigation experiments.
Experience has shown, however, that such experiments are an
iterative process. The knowledge gained from a particular mission
will most certainly result in some level of replanning and redesign.
This can, in-turn, create a need for additional on-orbit testing. For
those experiments which require Shuttle-Mir flights or extended
presence aboard Mir, the need for several iterations could increase
the demand for Shuttle-Mir missions beyond the seven currently
planned.
Another consideration is the need for NASA and RSA to develop
and refine a joint operations capability. NASA will be working with
RSA in an environment which it has not experienced since the days
of the Skylab long duration missions. This will require a complete
change of culture from the current scenario of relatively short
Shuttle missions. The NASA operations team will have to transition
from the current bursts of activity surrounding each Shuttle mission
to sustained support for Mir activities involving U.S. astronauts
which will span months rather than days or weeks.
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The recent Joint Management Working Group agreement provides
the option to add missions back into the schedule. In all subsequent
negotiations and agreements with RSA that touch on this subject,
similar guarantees must be secured.
3.2.3 Recommendation
3.2.3.1 NASA must retain the flexibility to insert as many as
three additional Phase 1 docking missions, up to the ten
agreed upon with RSA, for as long as possible.
3.3 Modification of Second Orbiter for Shuttle-Mir Docking
3.3.1 Issue: The requirement to modify a second Orbiter for Shuttle-Mir
docking can result from one of two conditions. If more than seven
Shuttle-Mir missions need to be completed in the time allotted (i.e.,
prior to January 1998), a second Orbiter -- Discovery, Orbiter Vehicle-
103 (OV-103) -- will be needed. Should Atlantis (OV-104), the only
Orbiter currently capable of Mir docking, experience any significant
down-time, a second Orbiter will be required to ensure completion
of the planned missions.
3.3.2 Obse_ations
The current baseline Orbiter Maintenance Down Period (OMDP)
Airlock Modification for OV-103 includes 1) removal of the internal
airlock, 2) installation of the external airlock in the ISSA location, 3)
installation of the 5th cryogenic tank set, and 4) installation of
plumbing for four additional nitrogen tanks. This configuration
would preclude the need for an additional modification period on
OV-103, and would provide a backup vehicle to support ISSA First
Element Launch (FEL). The disadvantages of performing this
complete modification at this time are that OV-103:
• could not support the full Hubble Space Telescope (HST)
second servicing mission requirements;
• would lose full cargo bay capability (on a max performance
vehicle);
• would lose approximately 4000 lbs. of payload capability
and 3 inches of vehicle Center of Gravity (CG); and
• would require new integration hardware to be compatible
with Spacehab.
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An option to perform the full OMDP modification was presented to
the Task Force which would:
• not require removal of the internal airlock;
• scar the vehicle for the external airlock (electrical only);
• install the external airlock;
If OV-103 Mir flights were required once the vehicle is in this
configuration, the external air lock could be installed and used with
the internal airlock. This process would have a schedule impact to
Orbiter processing flow of approximately 15 days. This option
supports the full HST requirements and maintains maximum cargo
bay and ascent capability on a max performance vehicle. It would,
however, require an 11 month ISSA modification period at the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) to remove the internal airlock and
install the external airlock prior to ISSA flights. This could create
some overlapping of orbiter modification periods, and if so could
require additional ground support equipment to remove internal
airlocks at two different centers.
The Space Shuttle Program Office recommended deferring the OV-
103 post OMDP configuration final decision until April 1995 which
meets the Orbiter Project decision need date. This would allow a
more thorough and complete assessment of cost, schedule, and
operational impacts of the modification decision.
The Task Force concurs with the Space Shuttle Program Office in
deferring the OV-103 post OMDP configuration final decision. The
Task Force will review the status of the OV-103 OMDP modification
decision at the next Task Force meeting.
3.3.3 Recommendations
No additional recommendations.
3.4 STS-63 Shuttle-Mir Objectives
3.4.1 Previous Recommendations
3.4.1.1 Because STS-63 represents the only opportunity to test the
hardware, techniques, and operational procedures to be
used in Mir rendezvous and proximity operations, the
Mir-related objectives must be given the top priority on
the mission.
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3.4.2
3.4.1.2 An approach of within 30 feet of Mir should be made on
STS-63 to accomplish the "Near Mir Fly-By Objectives".
3.4.1.3 The Color Television Camera (CTVC) camera should be
manifested on STS-63 and mounted in the Spacehab
module in order to:
• perform a CTVC visibility checkout to include
recording of camera output for post-mission
evaluation;
• evaluate lighting and shadow effects on the target
image; and
• conduct attitude fly-out tests in low-Z.
3.4.1.4 Investigate the value of performing attitude fly-out tests in
low-Z using the CTVT mounted on the Remote
Manipulator System (RMS) elbow camera location.
Observations
Mission Priorities
As reported to the Task Force, the Mir rendezvous and proximity
operations to be conducted on STS-63 have now been estabhshed as
the primary payload on that mission. During the phasing
maneuver, a number of the experiments involving the Shuttle
Pointed Autonomous Research Tool for Astronomy (SPARTAN) will
be completed while SPARTAN is still attached to the RMS. As a
result, the STS-63 crew will be able to rendezvous with Mir and
conduct the proposed proximity operations prior to the free flight of
SPARTAN.
Approach to Mir
Regarding the approach of the Orbiter to Mir during proximity
operations on STS-63, another significant outcome of the September
meeting of the Joint Management Working Group was the
agreement by RSA to allow an approach to within 10 meters (32.5
feet). This important agreement resulted from the thorough work
done by NASA in explaining the benefits of such an approach to the
RSA representatives.
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3.4.3
CTVC Camera
The CTVC will be flown aboard STS-63 in order to perform a
checkout of the Mir docking target and related visibility issues.
Although the RMS will not be available on either STS-63 or STS-71
to simulate the CTVC position on STS-74, the Task Force is satisfied
that an adequate evaluation with associated data can be performed
based on the results obtained from the Spacehab CTVC position on
STS-63.
Recommendations
No additional recommendations.
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4.0 ORBITER DOCKING SYSTEM (ODS)
4.10DS Reliability
4.1.1 Previous Recommendations
4.1.1.1 Ensure that the ODS active hooks will be cycled as part of
the ODS testing to be conducted at KSC prior to STS-71.
4.1.1.2 Investigate the feasibility of accelerating the schedule for
the second Androgenous Peripheral Docking System
(APDS) in time to serve as a backup for STS-71 and the
impacts involved in doing so.
4.1.2 Observations
ODS Active Hook Cycling
The test requirement for cycling of the ODS active hooks is
currently being reviewed. Baselining of the test requirement is
expected by mid-October. Serious consideration is being given to
performing this test using a passive docking ring rather than simply
cycling the hooks.
Second APDS as Backup for STS-71
It is not possible to accelerate the delivery of the second APDS
because it will be undergoing testing and fit checks for STS-74. The
second APDS will be used on the STS-74 ODS where it will be
mated to the Docking Module on-orbit prior to Mir docking. It will
need to remain at NPO-Energia I until the testing, particularly the fit
checks with the Docking Module, are completed. Given the
importance of those activities, the Task Force recognizes that the
second APDS will not be available at KSC as a backup for STS-71.
Additional Observations
The complexity of the APDS portion of the ODS, manufactured by
NPO-Energia in Russia, and the test anomalies experienced to date
1 NPO-Energia is now RKK-Energia. To avoid confusion, however, NPO-Energia will
continue to be used for the purposes of this report.
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4.1.3
continue to be a subject of concern to the Task Force. However,
there is an increasing level of confidence among the individuals in
the ODS avionics and mechanical systems areas with regard to the
current APDS subsystem. This confidence has evolved as they
became more familiar with the device and monitored testing of it.
The Task Force recognizes that differences between NASA and RSA
in design approach, documentation philosophy, test and certification
procedures exist and must be accommodated. In addition, budget
and time constraints preclude major redesign modifications.
However, every reasonable effort must be made to specifically
identify those items which cause concern, and to modify within
reason those items which increase confidence level within existing
budget constraints.
The Orbiter Project Office has provided the Space Station Program
Office with a set of preliminary ISSA docking hardware
requirements which are changes to the current APDS specifications.
This document attempts to spell out the minimum set of
requirements necessary to ensure a safe and successful Space
Shuttle/Space Station docking program. These requirements, when
finalized, will be inserted into the RSA APDS procurement
specifications.
The Task Force concurs with the scope, content, and rationale of the
proposed Orbiter Project requirements. It also recognizes the
urgency involved in identifying, as completely as possible, those
specific items requiring redesign so that the resulting specifications
can be included in the negotiations with RSA and the resulting
implementation process. It is important, however, to acknowledge
the importance of this subsystem and to maintain the option to
respond to significant anomalies which are encountered or
necessary improvements which are identified as NASA gains on-
orbit experience with the system.
Recommendations
4.1.3.1 NASA should ensure that those items of the Preliminary
Delta Requirements for ISSA Program Androgynous
Peripheral Docking System (APD$) Hardware
memorandum dated October 14, 1994 which are
ultimately identified as the minimum set of
requirements necessary to ensure a safe and successful
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Shuttle/ISSA docking program be inserted in the RSA
APDS procurement specification and implemented.
4.1.3.2 Because of the importance of this subsystem, NASA
should actively continue to consider options for
improving the APDS.
4.2 Pyrotechnic Bolt Demate Contingency
4.2.1 Observations
The reliability and safety certification data for the pyrotechnics bolts
employed on the Shuttle/Mir Orbiter Docking System (ODS)
emergency separation subsystem have not been made available to
NASA. The explanation for not providing the data is that the
pyrotechnic bolts are classified SECRET because they are also used
in various military applications. Without this data, the only means
that NASA has for determining the risk associated with this critical
hardware is to conduct independent testing to certify the bolts for
the Shuttle/Mir STS-71 mission. The certification requirements
include the Phase 1 Baseline Review, the Phase 2 Production
Review, and Phase 3 Lot Acceptance and Certification Review.
In an effort to meet the intent of the certification requirements,
NASA and Rockwell, working with NPO-Energia, are proposing to
take the remaining 60 pyrotechnic bolts for the lot used in the STS-
71 APDS and perform a test program to provide data for that
particular lot. This test program was developed by identifying the
primary concerns which included; 1) Corrosion, 2) Dudding, 3)
Assembly/Process Control, 4) Age Life, and 5) Design Performance.
Successful completion of the proposed test program will enable
NASA to develop an adequate level of confidence in the Russian
pyrotechnic device and subsystem for the proposed STS-71 mission.
The pyrotechnic bolts used in the STS-74 APDS will be from a
different manufacturing lot than those used on STS-71. Testing on a
quantity of bolts from that lot will be required in order to certify the
bolts used in STS-74 and subsequent missions.
4.2.2 Recommendation
4.2.2.1 NASA should prepare a contingency plan that provides
an alternative method for Shuttle-Mir demating in the
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event that the testing of the pyrotechnic bolts produces
unacceptable results.
4.2.2.2 If the reliability and safety certification data for the
pyrotechnic bolts continues to be unavailable from RSA,
NASA should pursue the option to have replacement
pyrotechnic bolts manufactured for STS-74 and
subsequent missions which satisfy the NASA
certification process.
4.3 EVA Demate Contingency
4.3.1 Previous Recommendations
4.3.1.1 The EVA approach to remove the 96 bolts which fasten
the ODS docking base to the ODS external airlock should
be developed and baselined as a contingency approach for
APDS mechanical system and pyrotechnic failures.
4.3.1.2 Determine the tools, support equipment (e.g., handholds,
portable foot restraint locations, etc.), training schedule,
and equipment fidelity (e.g., Weightless Environment Test
Facility, mock-ups, etc) needed to support the EVA
demate contingency for STS-71 and, if necessary,
subsequent missions.
4.3.1.3 Establish EVA procedures including a method to ensure
positive, simultaneous, and symmetrical release.
4.3.2 Obse_ations
EVA removal of the 96 ODS bolts by EVA has been established as a
contingency demate option. As the third means of separation of the
Orbiter from the Mir docking port, the EVA method will be
required in the event that the mechanical docking hooks fail to
retract properly and, subsequently, the pyrotechnic bolts do not free
the docking hooks. The EVA will require that the Shuttle-Mir stack
be stabilized through relatching of the docking hooks.
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Planning and preparation for the EVA have already begun.
strides have been made in the following areas:
• Overall operational scenario
• Hardware requirements
EVA compatible nuts and bolts
Bolt removal tools
Restraining clamps
Major
EVA support equipment
ODS mockups for use in the Weightless Environment
Training Facility and 1 g. training
Procedures development
Crew training
Stowage requirements
Although the Task Force views these developments as very positive,
members of the Task Force will continue to track development of
the EVA option.
Furthermore, the Task Force would like to note that the current
EVA plan will leave the Mir port unaccessible for docking.
Although the STS-71 mission preparation timeline dictates that the
removal of the 96 bolts be the focus of EVA preparations and
training, NASA should continue to consider other EVA-based
options which would not block the Mir port.
4.3.3 Recommendations
4.3.3.1 Continue to investigate options which will leave the Mir
port available for subsequent dockings should the EVA
contingency be necessary.
4.40DS/Docking Module (DM) Fit Checks
4.4.1 Previous Recommendations
4.4.1.1 Verify that the shipping environment did not adversely
impact the three APDSs following their shipment from
NPO-Energia where the final fit check will be performed.
4.4.1.2 Revisit the risk decision and assess the risk involved in
handling the Docking Module as well as the ground
support equipment needed to perform an ODS/DM fit
check.
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4.4.2 Observations
The final decision has not been made regarding the fit check of the
ODS/DM mechanical interface. There is, however, reluctance to
perform this task due to the extensive ground support and handling
equipment required, including some possible facility limitations.
4.4.3 Recommendations
4.4.3.1 If not already under consideration, determine the
feasibility of installing maximum accelerometers in each
of the APDS shipping crates during transportation.
4.4.3.2 Continue to pursue the possibility of performing the
ODS/DM fit check. The importance of performing the
fit check on the ground before attempting to mate the
two units on-orbit dictates that all reasonable approaches
to performing the fit check be examined. Documented
rationale should be provided for methods which are
considered but not chosen.
4.5 Docking Module Safety Reviews
4.5.1 Previous Recommendation
4.5.1.1 Evaluate DM safety review schedule acceleration vs. risk
acceptance.
4.5.2 Observations
Based on the June 1995 expected delivery date of the DM, the Joint
Safety Assurance Working Group has scheduled the milestone
safety review consistent with the required delivery dates of the
safety data packages per the RSA contract. That schedule is as
follows:
• US/RSA contract states delivery of 11/15/94
DM payload safety data
• Delivery of DM ground safety data 12/15/94
• DM Payload Safety Data Pack 12/02/94
(NASA/Rockwell/NPO-Energia)
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4.5.3
• DM Payload Safety Data Pack
(NASA/Rockwell/NPO-Energia)
• Shuttle Payload Safety Review Panel
Meeting (joint flight and ground)
Phase 1/2
• NPO-Energia Phase3 Safety Data
• Phase3 Data Pack
(NASA / Rockwell/NPO-Energia)
• Phase 3 Panel Meeting
• DM delivery to KSC
Recommendations
No additional recommendations.
12/02/94
02/15/95
03/15/95
03/31/95
05/08/95
06/01/95
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5.0 PLUME, DOCKING, AND MATED LOADS
5.1 Plume Loads
5.1.1 Observations
Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight Experiment (SPIFEX)
The data from the SPIFEX experiment conducted on STS-64 has
been received and preliminary data analysis is underway. Data
analysis is to be completed by December 30, 1994. A quick-look
overview of the data shows measured plume pressures are bounded
by math model estimates. Preliminary data shows excellent
agreement between the model and axisymmetric nozzle case
Plume Loads Calculations
JSC initially performed solar panel plume loads calculations with
the solar panels modeled as perfectly flat, smooth, thin plates. The
loads path in these calculations is plume loading on mathematical
plates transmitted to the solar panel spine, modeled as a
mathematical beam. Photographs indicated that the Kvant module
panels have a surface shape of accordion pleats and are not attached
along the length of the mast but only at the base and tip. The
accordian shade model has since been included in the loads
analysis.
Russian Loads Predictions
The Russian loads predictions have not been presented to nor
reviewed by NASA analysts.
5.1.2 Recommendations
5.1.2.1 Process all remaining SPIFEX data expeditiously and
provide the results to the Russians as quickly as
possible to enable them to update their loads
calculations on critical Mir elements.
5.1.2.2 Validate the structural model of the Mir solar panels
and understand the panel loads constraints.
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5.1.2.3 Request that RSA provide their updated plume loads
analysis results.
5.2 Docking Loads
5.2.1 Previous Recommendations
5.2.1.1 The robustness of the Russian Mir model must be fully
analyzed and understood in order to assess stack dynamic
response.
5.2.2 Observations
NASA's current Mir attitude control system (ACS) expertise was
developed to evaluate Mir attitude responses to Shuttle plume
excitations during proximity operations. Additional analysis tasks
are being added, including response to contact loads during STS-71
and STS-74.
5.2.3 Recommendation
5.2.3.1 Expand understanding of the Mir attitude control system
to encompass response to contact loads during STS-71
and STS-74.
5.3 Mated Loads
5.3.1 Previous Recommendation
5.3.1.1 A Loads Analysis Development Test Objective (DTO)
corresponding to the STS-71 DTO should be conducted on
STS-74. The data this DTO will produce is critical to the
safety of the Phase 1 program.
5.3.1.2 The Russian Mir structural dynamics model must be fully
analyzed and the resulting Digital Auto Pilot (DAP)
controllability and structural integrity determined.
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5.3.2 Observations
5.3.3
Loads Analysis DTOs
The Orbiter Project Office is planning to perform a Loads Analysis
DTO corresponding to that of STS-71 for the STS-74 mission. These
DTO data will be used to verify the adequacy of Primary Reaction
Control System (PRCS) DAP code for vehicle loading and stability.
It has been predicted that it will require less than 12 hours to
analyze these data, but this time estimate should be validated.
DAP StabiliW Margins
Recent non-linear simulations performed at Draper Laboratories
have identified stack instabilities in both PRCS and Vernier Reaction
Control System (VRCS) control modes with first-guess notch filter
designs. The notch filters were redesigned to be very wide (up to
the 10th order) and stability has been simulated in the presence of
the prescribed 20 percent uncertainty.
Mir Adaptive Notch Filters
It is believed that Mir exploits "adaptive notch filters" in its attitude
control system. Program assurance would be increased by verifying
the performance of these notch filters when they control the mated
Shuttle-Mir stack.
Recommendations
5.3.3.1 The analysis team should practice and demonstrate their
ability to rapidly exploit the flight data to be gathered
by the Loads Analysis DTO.
5.3.3.2 Mission assurance will be enhanced by reducing Mir
structural model uncertainty before flight and
maximizing DAP stability margins to this uncertainty
even if it exceeds 20 percent.
5.3.3.3 Mir's attitude control system must be better understood
in order to evaluate risk associated with Mir control of
stack attitude.
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5.3.3.4
5.3.3.5
Track the refined loads analysis resulting from the
higher fidelity models recommended in 5.1.2.2-3, 5.2.3.1,
and 5.3.3.1-3 above. Present progress reports to project
management to ensure that any loading issues will be
identified in sufficient time to mitigate programmatic
impact.
Consider expediting the Statement of Work to
TSNIIMASH to provide model validation of critical Mir
elements to support Recommendations 5.1.2.2, 5.3.1.1,
and 5.3.3.2 above.
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6.0 RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING
6.1 Rendezvous and Docking Training
6.1.1 Previous Recommendation
6.1.1.1 The verified Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight
Experiment (SPIFEX) data from STS-64 must be made
available on or before 15 February 1995, the current
schedule, and the Shuttle Engineering Simulator (SES)
updated with that data in adequate time to support STS-
71.
6.2
6.1.2
6.1.3
Tools
6.2.1
6.2.2
Observations
As mentioned in Section 5.0 (Plume, Docking, and Mated Loads)
above, the SPIFEX equipment performed successfully aboard STS-64.
The Task Force was advised that the SPIFEX test results and
updating of the plume model will be completed by January and
incorporated into the SES by February 1995. The updated model
will also be used to reevaluate the proximity operations and mated
loads analysis currently being used for mission planning.
Recommendations
No additional recommendations.
for Rendezvous and Docking (TRAD)
Previous Recommendations
6.2.1.1 During STS-63, perform Hand Held Lidar (HHL) tests
against the Mir complex and determine range-rate
accuracy and stability.
6.2.1.2 During STS-63, perform a range and range rate checkout
of the Trajectory Control System (TCS) against the Mir
complex.
Observations
The Task Force was advised that the test plan for the HHL and TCS
components of the Tools for Rendezvous and Docking (TRAD)
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system includes the tests recommended by the Task Force. The
testing will be performed under Development Test Objective (DTO)
836.
6.2.3 Recommendations
No additional recommendations.
6.3 Mir Approach Development Test Objective (DTO 835)
6.3.1 Previous Recommendation
6.3.1.1 Ensure that the Mir Approach DTO is fully implemented.
6.3.2 Observations
DTO 835 has been baselined in the Flight Requirements Documents
for STS-66, STS-63, and STS-69. With the agreement now in place
with RSA which will allow an approach within 30 feet of Mir on
STS-63, NASA maintains that all the DTO objectives can be met.
6.3.3 Recommendations
No additional recommendations.
6.4 V-Bar or R-Bar Approach for STS-63 and STS-71
6.4.1 Previous Recommendation
6.4.1.1 To avoid impacting the RSA assessment teams considering
loads, power, and communications, NASA should not
propose changing from the planned V-bar approach on
STS-63 to an R-bar approach. However, in all subsequent,
relevant discussions with RSA, the reduced RCS braking
requirements of the R-bar approach and the associated
plume loads and contamination reductions should be
emphasized. In addition, NASA should advise that they
stand ready and willing to perform either a V-bar or R-bar
approach based on the results of the Mir analysis. A date
for the decision on the approach should be established to
provide adequate time for crew training.
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6.4.2 Observations
The Task Force was briefed on the probable launch delay of the
Spektr module. The absence of the Spektr module as part of the
Mir complex may impose significant changes to the original
operations plan.
First, the attitude of the Mir stack may need to rotated 90 degrees
about the velocity vector axis to accommodate Mir solar power
generation requirements. This will require the Orbiter to approach
in an attitude different from that verified and practiced to date.
Second, the need to keep the Mir solar arrays in a solar track mode
(i.e., pointed at the Sun) rather than in a feathered position (i.e.,
perpendicular to the Shuttle approach vector) may require the entire
approach and docking process to be conducted through low-Z
reaction control system firings. Maintaining a low-Z approach
within the last 30 feet of the approach, rather than switching to a
norm-Z approach at 30 feet, will impact precise attitude control.
Third, the possibility also exists that Mir power constraints may
result in a change from the planned V-bar approach to an R-bar
approach. If a decision is delayed too long, the crew will either
have to be trained in both approaches or have their training
compressed into a less than optimum schedule.
6.4.3 Recommendations
No additional recommendations.
6.5 Payload Bay (PLB) Very High Frequency (VHF) Antenna
6.5.1 Previous Recommendation
6.5.1.1 Ensure that the test plan for STS-63 window-mounted
antenna includes performance assessment with respect to
Mir antenna patterns.
6.5.2 Observations
Analysis is currently being performed on the Mir antenna pattern
and the resulting coverage capability. These results will be factored
into the VHF communications test plan.
6.5.3 Recommendations
No additional recommendations.
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7.0 APPENDIX A: ACRONYM LIST
ACS
A1T
APDS
AR&D
CB
CG
CoFR
CMEV
CR
CTVC
DAP
DM
DTO
ET
EVA
FEL
HHL
HST
IMU
IFr
ISSA
Lidar
jsc
KSC
MOA
NASA
NSTS
OAST-Flyer
ODS
OLMSA
OMDP
OSMA
OV
OV-103
OV-104
PCMMU
PFR
PGSC
PIO
PLB
PRCB
Attitude Control System
Analysis Integration Team
Androgenous Peripheral Docking System
Automated Rendezvous and Docking
Control Board
Center of Gravity
Certificate of Flight Readiness
Command Message Encoder Verifier
Change Request
Color Television Camera
Digital Autopilot
Docking Module
Development Test Objective
External Tank
Extra-Vehicular Activity
First Element Launch
Hand Held Lidar
Hubble Space Telescope
Inertial Measurement Unit
Integrated Product Team
International Space Station Alpha
(Li)ght (D)etection (a)nd (R)anging
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
John F. Kennedy Space Center
Memorandum of Agreement
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Space Transportation System
Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology - Flyer
Orbiter Docking System
Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications
Orbiter Maintenance Down Period
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
Orbiter Vehicle
Discovery
Atlantis
Pulse Code Master Modulation Unit
Portable Foot Restraint
Payload and General Support Computer
Public Information Officer
Payload Bay
Program Review Control Board
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ACRONYMS (Continued)
PRCS
Prox Ops
PSC
R-bar
RCS
RMS
ROCC
RPOP
RSA
RTLS
SAREX
SES
SLSD
SPARTAN
SPAS
SPIFEX
SRB
SSP
SPO
SSPO
TCS
TRAD
V-bar
VHF
VRCS
WETF
WG-0
WG-1
WG-2
WG-3
WG-4
WG-5
WG-6
WG-7
WG-8
Primary Reaction Control System
Proximity Operations
Payload Steering Committee
Radius Vector
Reaction Control System
Remote Manipulator System
Range Operations Control Center
Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Program
Russian Space Agency
Return to Launch Site
Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment
Shuttle Engineering Simulator
Space and Life Sciences Division (JSC)
Shuttle Pointed Autonomous Research Tool for Astronomy
Shuttle Pallet Satellite
Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight Experiment
Solid Rocket Booster
Space Shuttle Program
Shuttle Program Office
Space Station Program Office
Trajectory Control Sensor
Tools for Rendezvous and Docking
Velocity Vector
Very High Frequency
Vernier Reaction Control System
Weightless Environment Training Facility
Joint Management Working Group
Joint
Joint
Joint
Joint
Joint
Joint
Joint
Joint
Public Relations Working Group
Safety Assurance Working Group
Flight Operations and Systems Integration Working Group
Mission Science Working Group
Crew Training and Exchange Working Group
Mir Operations and Systems Integration Working Group
Extravehicular Activity Working Group
Medical Operations Working Group
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